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Abstract:  Prepared as an introductory chapter to a forthcoming 
book on the distribution sector in Japan, this essay introduces the basic 
structure of the industry.  We note the way competition drives 
consumers, sellers, and manufacturers to select distributional 
arrangements that minimize total costs, and the way that this 
distributional equilibrium will depend both on patterns of consumer 
demand and on production technology. 
To illustrate the way that cross-national distributional practices 
vary less than often thought, we compare automobile distribution in 
Japan and the U.S. 
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  Call it the bad boy of the Japanese economy.  A sultry worker, it refuses to 
perform at the levels of its manufacturing peers.  A sore loser, it stays in business by 
buying politicians, manipulating bureaucrats, and cheating every which way.  A poor 
player generallly, it struts and frets its hour upon the stage -- and then is heard from 
again and yet again. 
Follow the usual intellectual press, and that is pretty much what one reads 
about the distribution sector in Japan.  Take James Fallows, writing for the Atlantic in 
1994:   
Anglo-American economic theory can explain why Japanese prices are so 
high:  the retail system is full of cartels and monopolies.  A network of laws, 
contracts, and commercial agreements in Japan discourages discounting and 
price competition.  Until it was relaxed in the 1990s, Japan’s famous dai ten 
ho, or “big store law” effectively outlawed supermarkets ... 
Outlawed supermarkets?  One wonders where Fallows bought his groceries when he 
lived in Tokyo.  Yet to be fair, Fallows is not alone.  He does accurately capture the 
gist of the conventional wisdom about Japanese distribution.  The trouble is, the 
conventional wisdom is wrong -- and in this book the several authors explain how it is 
wrong.   
We use this Chapter 1 to introduce the basic themes in their collective research.  
We start with a short background to the distribution sector, and then use examples to 
illustrate several basic points that will recur throughout the book:  that firms choose 
their distribution arrangements subject to constraints imposed by the product they sell 
-- constraints keyed both to patterns of consumer demand and to manufacturing 
technology; that notwithstanding those constraints, firms generally retain room for 
variation and experimentation in distribution; and that superficial differences in 
distribution across countries can mislead profoundly -- at root, Japanese and 
American distribution differ less than most observers have noticed. 
Structurally, we follow a short overview of Japanese distribution (Section 1) 
with four short and one quite long non-randomly selected examples.  In Sections 2 
and 3, we outline the distribution practices for several firms in the apparel, sporting-
good, cosmetics, and detergent industries.  Through the first two industries, we show 
how patterns of consumer demand and manufacturing technology can sometimes 
cause wholesalers to integrate either backward into production or forward into 
retailing.  Through the last two, we show how those constraints imposed by demand 
or technology can still leave firms room to experiment with alternative distribution 
arrangements.  In our much longer Section 4, we use the distribution arrangements in 
the automobile industry to illustrate the way Japanese and U.S. distribution practices 
may differ less than usually thought.  Like the other authors in this book, we focus on 
empirics and keep the theoretical apparatus to a minimum. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Background 
  Critics may see the Japanese manufacturing sector as modern and productive, 
but they routinely dismiss the rest of the economy as obsolete.  The distribution sector 
they dismiss as egregiously so.  If they have the story right, consumers incur huge 
costs.  Suggestive evidence of such costs is easy to find (as Fallows’ comment 
reflects).  In Table 1.1A, we reproduce a recent survey of price differentials among 
several cities.  By these numbers, food in Tokyo is 77 percent more expensive than in  
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New York, and nearly double the price in London.  Apparel similarly costs nearly 
twice as much as in New York or London.  Because price comparisons depend 
heavily on volatile exchange rates, in Table 1.1B we use purchasing-price-parity 
measures to compare factor productivity.  Given the limited data available we 
examine real value-added in 1987, but the conclusion is just as stark:  in distribution, 
Japanese productivity is half that of the U. S. and Germany.  
According to many observers, not only Japanese consumers but foreign 
manufacturers suffer too.  Through the early 1990s Japan imported “usually” low 
volumes of finished goods, they explain, and much of the reason lay in the 
distribution sector.  Only through draconian barriers against competition did the 
obsolete distributors manage to stay in business.  With 18 percent of total employment 
(1994), by staying in business they wasted human resources on a massive scale.    
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Table 1.1:  Distribution Costs 
 
A.  Prices in Tokyo Relative to Selected Cities, 1995 
 
 New  York  London  Paris  Geneva 
Total 1.59  1.52  1.34  1.02 
Food 1.77  1.99  1.78  1.24 
Durable Goods  1.47  1.15  0.94  0.93 
Apparel, Shoes  1.93  1.81  1.50  0.93 
 
  Note:  Exchange Rate -- Annual average. $1 = 94.06 
yen, £1 = 148.47 yen, 1 franc = 18.84 yen, 1 Swiss franc 
= 79.54 yen. 
 
 
B.  Productivity in Distribution (Purchasing Power 
Parity) 
 
  Labor Productivity  Total Factor Productivity 
Germany 0.96  0.97 
U. K.  0.82  0.86 
France 0.69  0.71 
Japan 0.44  0.55 
 
  Note:  1987 -- U.S. = 1. 
 
  Source:  Panel A -- Economic Planning Agency, ed., 
Price Report table 3-1-2 (Tokyo:  Economic Planning 
Agency, 1996); Panel B -- McKinsey Global Institute, ed., 
Service Sector Productivity (Washington D. C.:  McKinsey 
Global Institute, 1992). 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
1.2.  Issues 
  Observers have suggested several cumulative reasons for these phenomena.  
At the outset, many argue that Japanese wholesaling contains too many levels.  In 
moving from manufacturer to retailer, they note, a product can travel through primary, 
secondary, and tertiary wholesalers.  In the process, they continue, it will accumulate 
massive wholesale margins.  If eventually sold through one of the many small stores, 
it will incur high retailing costs besides.   
In competitive markets, of course, such a system would not survive.  If 
wholesalers and retailers acted inefficiently, other firms (including foreign firms) 
could earn large profits by replacing them.  For the inefficient firms to survive (and 
for foreign firms to stay out), some aspect of the Japanese institutional framework 
must exclude more efficient rivals.   
To “solve” this logical problem, analysts jumped on the Large-Scale Retail 
Stores Act.  The Act imposed costly barriers against new large retailers.  Clearly, it 
raised consumer prices (as discussed by Tsuruta and Yahagi in Chapter 6, and by  
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Nishimura, Tachibana and Tsubouchi in Chapter 2).  Just as clearly, it excluded large 
foreign retailers.  What is less clear is why it would have excluded foreign products.   
One potential explanation lay with the “keiretsu.”  Japanese manufacturers, 
some observers explained, excluded foreign manufacturers by locking up existing 
distributors in their keiretsu.  Through these networks, they maintained extraordinarily 
opaque relationships characterized by customary norms involving trade support, price 
concessions, return policies, and even seconded employees.  Through these networks, 
they imposed contractual terms that excluded rivals foreign and domestic. 
Alas, all this still did not a competitive equilibrium make.  Saying that 
incumbent politicians increase their electoral odds through inefficient industrial policy 
is one thing.  Saying that manufacturers in competitive markets increase profits 
through inefficient distribution systems is quite another.  Suppose one electrical 
appliance manufacturer locked up a set of retailers in its network of dedicated small 
stores.  A new entrant could not sell through those retailers, granted.  It could still sell 
through existing large stores -- which, after all, were never part of a distribution 
keiretsu.  It could also do what the incumbent did, and simply build its own network 
of small stores. 
Given these logical problems, the various authors to this volume propose 
alternative, more straightforward explanations for Japanese distribution practices.   
Depending on the industry, for example, any apparent inefficiency may be a 
transitional phenomenon; may misdescribe the facts; may reflect different consumer 
preferences in Japan; may reflect attempts structurally to mitigate agency problems in 
distribution; or may reflect technological constraints in manufacturing.  This book is 
about those many alternatives.   
 
2.  CONSUMER DEMAND AND EFFICIENCY
1 
2.1  Apparel 
  Distribution is not a service independent of the products distributed.  Instead, 
it depends fundamentally both on consumer demand patterns and on the 
manufacturing technology involved.  To see this, take a representative firm -- call it A 
Co. -- in the apparel industry.  Although primarily a wholesaler, A is much more.  On 
the one hand, it has integrated backward into manufacturing.  To be sure, it still buys 
apparel other firms have made at their own initiative.  Yet it also commissions 
products that it thinks will sell, and makes some items on its own.  On the other, it has 
partially integrated forward into retail.  Of its 9,000 employees, it has seconded many 
to assorted retailing firms that handle its products.   
  Suppose, hypothetically, that foreign firm F decided to compete with A.   
Toward that end, it approached one of the department stores where A sold its goods.  
It asked the store to handle its goods as well.  What would F Co. likely find?   
Primarily, it would find the department store maddeningly obtuse.  First, because A 
Co. sold its products on consignment, it would find that the department store could 
not evaluate merchandise.  It had no capacity to evaluate because it had little need for 
one.  A sent its products on consignment, and even supplied the sales force.   
Fundamentally, A rather than the department store bore most of the business risk 
involved. 
  Second, F Co. would find the department store extremely demanding.  Given 
that the store would likely want F to offer the merchandise on consignment too, it 
                     
1 The examples below are based both on publicly available data and on interviews with company 
personnel.  
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would promise no minimum purchases.  It would demand that F Co. take back unsold 
merchandise.  It would expect F Co. to provide much of the sales force.   
  Because it lacked the skill to judge F Co.’s unfamiliar merchandise, suppose 
the department store demanded that F work through a wholesaler.  To F Co., the 
distribution system would now seem multi-tiered and needlessly inefficient.  Given 
that A Co. would still be selling directly, it would also seem biased against foreigners.   
  Turn then to representative firm B Co., a firm that makes designer-label 
clothing for young women.  Begun as a buyer for clothing manufacturers, in the late 
1970s it moved into the designer-label business in the market for young women’s 
apparel.  By 1990, it ran a chain of 600 retail shops, employed 1,200 workers, and had 
sales of 40 billion yen on 14 labels.  A had sold to a broad range of retailers.  By 
contrast, B sold through its own network of dedicated retailers. 
B succeeds because its vertical integration speeds the transmission of market 
information from consumer to producer.  Speed matters because of the peculiarities of 
this segment of the apparel market.  Given the short lifespan for products in the young 
women’s apparel market, apparel firms cannot use the past sales to determine future 
production.  By the time they learn whether a given product sold, consumers have 
moved to something else.   
Accordingly, firms survive in this submarket only if they can translate 
consumer demands into production more rapidly than their competitors.  B Co. 
integrated into manufacturing and retail precisely to increase that speed.  A had not, 
because it competed primarily in submarkets where change proceeds more 
deliberately. 
 
2.2  Sporting goods 
  Now take C Co., a sporting goods manufacturer.  Although nominally a 
wholesaler, like A Co. C develops and produces its own products.  It sells primarily to 
a single chain of 230 retailers.   
  C integrated backward into manufacturing for reasons close to those that led B 
to integrate forward into retailing.  Traditionally, manufacturers in this industry 
independently decided what to produce.  Wholesalers then chose from among those 
products the goods they thought they could sell to retailers.  In this environment, a 
wholesaler might well know best the goods local consumers wanted, but it would 
have no ready channel by which to induce a manufacturer to supply them.  By 
integrating backward, C could respond more quickly to consumer demand. 
Note, however, the implications of these discussions for assessing efficiency.  
Given the retail market constraints in the industries involved, distribution channels 
could not plausibly stay inefficient.  Any firm that relied on an inefficient distribution 
network would simply -- and promptly -- go out of business. 
 
3.  DISTRIBUTION VARIETY AND EXCLUSION 
3.1  Cosmetics 
  In the cosmetics industry, firms making similar products use very different 
distribution channels.  Some firms maintain their own exclusive distributors who sell 
to non-exclusive retail chains:  Shiseido, Kanebo, and Max Factor.  Shiseido, for 
example, employs about 5,000 workers in R&D and production.  Yet, it additionally 
operates twelve distribution subsidiaries that collectively employ 15,000.  
  Other firms sell door-to-door through their own sales force:  Pola, Menado, 
and Noevia.  Still others sell through general wholesale and retail channels:  Kao, 
Lion, Mandom, and Kiss-me.  Although one could (and some observers do) try to  
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distinguish among the firms by clientele, one can exaggerate the distinctions.  Largely, 
the cosmetic firms sell interchangeable products.  Crucially, they distribute them 
through fundamentally different channels.   
 
3.2  Detergents 
  If some observers try to partition the cosmetics market by clientele, no one 
does for detergents.  Yet here, too, manufacturers selling interchangeable products 
distribute them in radically different ways.  Three major producers compete in the 
market:  Kao, Lion, and Proctor & Gamble.  They sell their products through 300,000 
retail stores.   
Each of the three producers uses its own distribution scheme.  Kao distributes 
to retailers through a distributor who handles only Kao products.  Lion and P&G sell 
through wholesalers who handle a variety of household products.  Lion, however, 
sells to some 300 primary distributors who then sell to 1,400 secondary distributors.  
P&G simply focuses on 50 distributors.   
Note now the implications this poses for claims about exclusion.  Most 
basically, these radical distributional differences make any talk about the distribution 
system excluding foreign manufacturers a non-starter.  In an industry like cosmetics 
or detergents, the distribution sector could not plausibly exclude -- for firms can too 
easily circumvent existing channels. 
 
4.  DECEPTIVE DIFFERENCES:  AUTOMOBILES 
4.1  Introduction 
As in many other discussions of the Japanese economy, observers of the 
Japanese car industry have focused less on function than on form.  They focus less on 
those functional attributes to distribution.  They focus more on apparent Japanese 
peculiarities.  They focus less on the common problems that manufacturers and 
dealers everywhere face.  They focus more on the way Japanese distribution channels 
exhibit apparent idiosyncrasies.   
In fact, U.S. and Japanese automobile distribution practices resemble each 
other closely.  That they do should not surprise.  In both countries, the industry 
involves similar manufacturing technology and similar consumer preferences.  The 
distribution sector simply ties that technology to those preferences.  To be sure, the 
technology is not identical.  If Toyota sells a car it makes in Aichi to a New York 
consumer, it cannot produce the car to order and deliver it in 10 days.  If it sells the 
car to an Osaka consumer, it can.  Neither are consumer preferences identical.  A 
suburban St. Louis consumer who uses a car for his 20-mile daily commute may want 
a different car from a Tokyo businessman who uses it for family outings on Sunday.
2 
In the rest of this Chapter 1, we use generally available data and simple micro-
economic logic to show the essential similarity between U.S. and Japanese automobile 
distribution practices.  We start by surveying the U.S. (Section 4.2) and Japanese 
markets (Section 4.3), and describing how one buys a car in Japan (Section 4.4).  We 
                     
2 Reflecting those different preferences and more, in 1999 Toyota manufactured in Japan 52 
models but sold in the U.S. only 20 (Toyota, 2000: 24).  It offered Japanese Corolla buyers a choice 
among 1,300 cc, 1,500 cc and 1,800 cc engines, but sold in the U.S. only the 1,800. It produced 
121,000 Siennas in 1999, but offered Japanese consumers none.  In turn, Honda offered Japanese 
consumers both a small (called the Odyssey) and a large minivan (the Lagreat), but sold only the large 
(still called the Odyssey) in the U.S.  And so one could continue, producer after producer.  
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then turn to four common misperceptions about Japanese automobile distribution 
(Section 4.5). 
 
4.2  Foreign cars in the U.S. 
The automobile industry has been a major part of the U.S. economy, and it has 
not been doing well.  The problems were a long time in coming.  American consumers 
began their switch to foreign cars with the Volkswagen beetle in the 1960s.  In 1960, 
Americans had bought 444,000 imports.  By 1970 they bought 2.0 million.   
Unable to replicate the success of the aging bug, Volkswagen began to wane 
by 1970, but Toyota, Nissan, and Honda continued where it stalled.  As of 1960, 
Japanese manufacturers produced 165,000 passenger cars, and exported (to any 
country) only 7,000.  By 1970, they produced 3 million passenger cars and sold 
312,000 in the U.S. -- 3.7 percent of the American market.  By 1980, they had 19.8 
percent of the American market, by 1990 27.8 percent, and by 1998 31.9 percent.
3 
 
4.3  Foreign Cars in Japan 
  Early years.  Although U.S. car makers had dominated the Japanese 
automobile market before World War II, when they returned after it they found a 
different reception.  Throughout much of the 1950s and early 1960s, they faced 
formidable import and foreign-exchange restrictions.  By 1965 the last of those 
barriers had disappeared (Shinomiya, 1998: 241), but outside the commercial vehicle 
sector the restrictions had probably been redundant anyway.  Most Japanese simply 
lacked the money to buy cars of any sort.  Much less did they have the money to buy 
the relatively expensive cars from the U.S. (Table 1.2A).  
Of the cars that Japanese consumers did buy in the early 1960s, many would 
have shocked American visitors.
4  Where the typical U.S. sedan sported a 4,000 cc 
(250 cubic inch) six-cylinder engine and weighed 3,000-5,000 pounds, Japanese 
consumers turned to 800-pound micro-cars with what were essentially 360 cc (22 
cubic inches) two-cylinder (often two-stroke) motorcycle engines.   
The Japanese government had long offered various regulatory advantages for 
these “light” cars.  In the late 1960s, it capped “light” car engines at 360 cc; today it 
caps them at 660 cc (Tsuji, 1990: 104-06).  Since the early 1960s, however, the 
fraction of cars catalogued as “light” has held constant at about 15-25 percent of the 
market:  97,000 of the 587,000 passenger cars sold in 1965, and 947,000 of the 4.1 
million sold in 1998 (Watanabe, 1999, 324). 
 
  Later changes  As Japanese grew richer, they did eventually buy more and 
bigger cars, but not the ones Detroit wanted to sell.  In 1970, they constituted the 
second largest automobile market in the world.  They bought 2.4 million passenger 
cars (compared to 8.4 million in the U.S.; Table 1.2A), but only 19,000 foreign 
passenger cars (less than 1 percent of the market).  By 1980, they bought increasingly 
bigger cars, but still only 46,000 foreign cars (1.6 percent of the market).  This 
                     
3 Watanabe (1999: 12, 14, 16).  Note that even in 1998 the Japanees manufacturers were not 
primarily “export-oriented.”  Their principal market remained Japan.  That year, they produced 8.1 
million passenger cars, but exported only 3.7 million globally.  They sold 2.6 million in the U.S.  Id.   
4 Prior to the mid-1950s, most Japanese automobile production had been oriented toward the taxi 
market.  Toyota introduced the Crown, however, for the passenger market in the mid-1950s.  Both it 
and Nissan self-consciously targetted the full-size (albeit much smaller than U.S. full-size cars) market, 
while companies like Subaru entered through the “light” car market.  
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combination of loyal domestic consumers and a growing export market made cars an 
important part of the Japanese economy, and there it has remained:  7-13 percent of 
aggregate manufacturing production, and 5-8 percent of manufacturing employment 
(Table 1.2D). 
Nor did foreign exchange shifts do much to help U.S. producers.  From 1984 
to 1987, the dollar plummeted from 251 yen to 125.  One might have thought (and 
many observers did think) Japanese consumers would now buy foreign cars.  Not so.  
By 1990 they still bought only 251,000 imported cars (4.9 percent of the market), and 
by 1998 only 269,000 (6.6 percent; down from 439,000 in 1996). 
 
  German cars.  To make matters worse for Detroit, when Japanese consumers 
did begin to buy foreign cars, they did not buy from the big three.  In 1990, 62 percent 
of the imported cars came from Germany, and only 13 percent from the U.S.  Of the 
latter, nearly half were the U.S.-made cars produced by Japanese firms (Nomura & 
Booz, 1994: VII 10).  Nor was this likely to change anytime soon.  In one 2000 
consumer survey of 700 potential buyers, the BMW 5-series came in as the most 
desired import; the 3-series came in second.  Various Mercedes Benz, Volvo, Jaguar, 
and Volkswagen models rounded out the top-10 list -- but no cars from Detroit (Nihon 
keizai, 2000). 
German producers have done well in Japan.  In 1998, Japanese consumers 
bought only 25,383 GM cars, 8,800 Chryslers, and 5,300 Fords.  Yet they bought 
50,500 VWs, 40,000 Mercedes Benz, and 30,200 BMWs.
5  During the same year, 
VW imported 86,800 cars to the U.S., Mercedes imported 127,100, and BMW 
imported 110,946.  Given that the U.S. passenger car market is twice that of Japan 
(Table 1.2A), VW effectively had 1.16 the market penetration in Japan that it had in 
the U.S., Mercedes had .63, and BMW .54.
6 
                     
5 And 23,800 cars produced in the U.S. by Japanese manufacturers.  Toyota (2000, 72). 
6 If one adjusts market penetration by total new vehicle sales rather than new passenger cars 
(16.0 million in the U.S.; 5.9 million in Japan), VW has 1.58 the market penetration in Japan that it has 
in the U.S., Mercedes has .86, and BMW has .74.  The current popularity in the U.S. of SUVs (classed 
as light trucks) arguably makes the focus on total vehicles more appropriate than passenger cars.    
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Table 1.2:  Automobile Industry -- Selected Statistics 
 
 
A.  Passenger Car Purchases (x 1000 units) 
 
   Japan U.S.  Germany    France    U.K. 
  1960    145  6,577    970    639    820 
 1970 2,373 8,388 2,107 1,297  1,127 
 1980 2,854 8,761 2,426 1,873  1,514 
 1990 5,102 9,103 3,041 2,309  2,009 
 1998 4,093 8,142 3,736 1,944  2,247 
 
B.  Passenger Car Production (x 1000 units) 
 
   Japan U.S.  Germany  France    U.K. 
 1960     165 6,703 1,817 1,116  1,353 
 1970 3,179 6,550 3,528 2,245  1,641 
 1980 7,038 6,376 3,521 2,939      924 
 1990 9,948 6,077 4,661 3,295  1,296 
 1998 8,056 5,554 5,348 2,582  1,748 
 
C.  Passenger Car Imports into Japan: 
 
  Total Imports  % of Purchases 
1960     3,500  2.4 
1970   19,000  0.8 
1980   46,000  1.6 
1990 251,000  4.9 
1998   269,000  6.6 
 
D.  Automobile Industry 
 
            Share of Japanese        Share of Japanese 
  . Industrial  production Industrial  employment 
 1965:   7.5  percent    5.0  percent 
 1975:   8.1      5.3 
 1985: 11.9      7.0 
 1995: 12.9      7.5 
 
 
 Sources:  Tsuyoshi Watanabe, Jidosha sangyo hando 
bukku 2000 nenban [Automobile Industry Handbook, 2000] 14, 
62, 234, 222, 214-15 (Tokyo:  Nikkan jidosha shimbun sha, 
1999).  
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4.4  Buying a Car in Japan 
Consumers buy cars somewhat differently in Japan than they do in the U.S.  In 
the U.S., the manufacturer produces cars with the specifications that match the 
demand it expects.  It sends the cars to its franchised dealers.  They in turn stock them 
in massive parking lots.  The quintessential consumer then visits several dealers, 
probably pretends to know more than he does, drives a few cars around the block, 
haggles over price, obtains a loan, and drives his new purchase home. 
Japanese consumers do sometimes buy from inventory.  They do sometimes 
visit showrooms.  Yet quintessentially the consumer does none of this.  Instead, about 
60 percent of the time he buys a car from a salesman who visits him at home (Morita 
& Nishimura, 2000: 16).  Fully half the time, moreover, he does not buy from 
inventory.
7  Instead, he chooses the model, color, and options he wants.  The dealer 
sends the order to the manufacturer by computer; the manufacturer relays the order to 
the appropriate factories; the factories incorporate it into their production plans; and 
the car arrives in a week or two.  
All this has several obvious implications for distribution.  Most obviously, 
dealers stock fewer cars.  Japan being the size of California, even the furthest point is 
an easy haul from a domestic Nissan or Toyota factory.  If consumers can obtain 
exactly the car they want from the factory in 10 days, dealers have less reason to fill 
parking lots with cars made on spec.  A Toyota outlet in Tokyo might have as few as 
3 cars in stock; an outlet with more space might have 5-6.  Consumers are also less 
likely to comparison-shop before they buy the car.  With less information, they are 
more likely to pay suggested retail. 
This distributional process involves more than the dealer.  Before a consumer 
can order a car, he must know about it.  Toward that end, someone must determine 
what sort of car what sort of consumer is likely to want.  Someone must translate that 
information about consumer preferences into automobile design.  Once designed, 
someone must advertise the car.  Someone must produce the requisite dealership 
pamphlets.  Someone must approach the customer and see that he obtains the 
information.   
Once a customer orders a car, the manufacturer must produce it.  Toward that 
end, someone must translate his order into sub-orders for the requisite parts.  Someone 
must assemble those parts.  Someone must contact the consumer and tell him when he 
can expect the car.  And someone must eventually haul the car back to the dealer.  
All this is distribution, yet all this involves far more than the dealer upon 
whom most discussions of distribution turn.  Here as with the examples earlier, the 
producers that thrive are the producers who effectively monitor distribution.  They are 
the producers who use distribution most effectively to learn consumer preferences and 
translate them into production.  
 
4.5  Automobile Distribution in Japan and the U.S. 
  Introduction.  In cross-national comparisons of automobile distribution, 
observers commonly propose several stereotypes about Japan: 
(a) Japanese dealerships are bigger than U.S. dealerships;  
                     
7 The industry mean is deceptive.  A much higher fraction of high-end cars are made to order 
than low-end.  Of all 12,000 Celsiors (base price:  5.4 million yen) ordered in September 2000, for 
example, fully 7,000 were individually spec’ed.  Of all 17,000 Corollas (base price:  1.1 million yen), 
only 400 were.  
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(b) Japanese dealerships have relationships with the manufacturer that are 
more exclusive than do U.S. dealerships;  
(c) Japanese dealers typically bundle with the cars they sell a larger package of 
services than U.S. dealers; and  
(d) Japanese dealers maintain longer-term relations with manufacturers than 
U.S. dealers.   
Although superficially true, these generalizations also badly mislead.  In the rest of 
this chapter, we discuss some of the ways they do. 
Preliminarily, note that as of about 1990 nine Japanese car markers sold their 
cars through 3,800-odd franchised dealers (3,148 dealers in 1999).  These dealers sold 
3.8 million units through their own outlets.  They sold another 680,000 to some 
60,000 independent outlets who sold the cars to the public.  These independent dealers 
act as agent for the customer, and obtain the car the customer wants from the car’s 
authorized dealers.  Out of deference to Japanese industry practice, references in this 
chapter to “dealership” include only the authorized dealers, and exclude these 60,000 
independent outlets (Nomura & Booz, 1994: III 4-5). 
As of about 1990, foreign producers sold their cars through 36 importers, who 
in turn sold to 600-odd franchised dealers maintaining 1000-odd outlets.  Total sales 
through this route came to 120,000 units.  In addition, 2,000 parallel importers bought 
directly overseas, by-passed the authorized dealers, and sold another 23,000 units 
(Nomura & Booz, 1994: III 4-5). 
 
 Size.    Typically, U.S. dealerships have been small.  They are still smaller than 
Japanese dealers, though the smallest have been steadily disappearing.  In 1970, there 
were 30,842 franchised new-car dealerships in the U.S. selling 8.4 million passenger 
cars.
8  By 1980, only 27,900 dealers remained, and by 1998 only 22,600 (selling 8.1 
million passenger cars; 16.0 million total vehicles).  More to the point, from 1980 to 
2000, the number of dealers selling fewer than 150 units fell from 10,602 to 4,161.  
During the same time, the number selling 750 or more units a year climbed from 
3,906 to 5,896 (NADA, 2000: p. 7). 
By contrast, Japanese dealers traditionally have been large.  Manufacturers 
began the 1950s with few dealers, and often assigned each an entire prefecture (there 
are 47 prefectures in Japan).  As the market for passenger cars grew, those dealerships 
added outlets, but the manufacturers only sporadically added dealers.   
  When Japanese manufacturers did add dealers, they rarely shrank the 
geographical scope they assigned the existing dealers.  Neither did they introduce 
directly competing dealers in the same territories.  Instead, they did what Honda did 
when it introduced Acura in the U.S. or -- more obviously -- what GM did with 
Chevrolet and Cadillac:  they segmented the market by product line (Table 1.3A). 
  For example, in the 1950s when Toyota sold almost no cars, it already had 
multiple dealership networks.  As sales grew through the 1970s, it steadily added 
dealers (Table 1.3B).  Since 1980 the number has held relatively constant.  As of 1999, 
Toyota and Nissan both had five lines of dealers (309 Toyota dealers and 196 Nissan 
dealers).  Mitsubishi (294 dealers), Isuzu (75 dealers), Mazda (777 dealers; 
recognizing its over-capacity it was trying to consolidate), and Honda (1,098 dealers) 
each had three lines.
9   
                     
8 10.2 million total vehicles.  Shinomiya (1998: 260); Watanabe (1999: 222). 
9 Nikkan (1999: 468).  This includes the somewhat idiosyncratic Honda Primo (922 dealers, 
1,441 outlets, 17,500 employees) and Mazda Autozam line (650 dealers, 704 outlets) of dealers.  
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Although U.S. dealers are smaller than Japanese dealers, the comparison 
fundamentally misleads.  If a U.S. “dealer” does not much resemble a Japanese 
“dealer,” it does resemble a large Japanese “outlet.”  In 1998-99, the 22,400 dealers in 
the U.S. on average used 48 employees to sell 363 passenger cars (712 vehicles). In 
1998, 17,242 Japanese outlets on average used 21 employees to sell 237 passenger 
cars (341 vehicles).  A U.S. dealer is much smaller than a Japanese dealer, but a bit 
larger than a Japanese outlet.
10  One could restate the contrast in terms of different 
patterns of integration:  in the U.S., the dealer performs only retail services, while the 
manufacturer has integrated forward into wholesale; in Japan, the manufacturer 
performs only production, while the retailer has integrated backward into wholesale. 
Unfortunately, modest differences in contracting customs fog the data.  In the 
U.S., manufacturers typically use outlet-specific franchise agreements.  As a result, a 
successful U.S. dealer who opens a second outlet will often negotiate a separate 
franchise agreement (Nomura & Booz, 1994: III-7) -- and appear in the data as two 
dealers.  A successful Japanese dealer who opens another outlet would remain in the 
data as one dealer.  
In any event, there is nothing necessary about these practices.  Just as the three 
detergent makers discussed earlier each use radically different distribution patterns, an 
automobile manufacturer in Japan could -- if it wanted -- use U.S.-style distribution 
patterns.  Such was exactly the strategy Honda used when it transformed itself from a 
motorcycle company into a major automobile producer.  As Honda began making cars 
in the mid-1960s, it largely sold them through its existing dealers.  Many of these had 
begun as motorcycle shops.  To recruit dealers who would focus exclusively on cars, 
in 1978 Honda opened a series of 89 “Verno” dealerships.  Except for one Kobe 
dealer with two outlets, each of these dealerships had one outlet.  Of the 63 
dealerships on which information survives, 50 had exactly 10 employees.  Although 
by 1988 the majority of the Verno dealerships had been successful enough to open 
multiple outlets, they still remained smaller than Toyota and Nissan dealers (Nikkan, 
various years). 
                     
10 Watanabe (1999: 222); NADA (2000: 7); Nikkan (1999: 486).  For reasons of data availability 
at the time of writing, we were forced to couple 1999 dealership data and 1998 sales data for the U.S.  
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Table 1.3:  Toyota Dealerships 
 
A.  Product Lines: 
 
                    1980                          1991     1999 
  Products   D     O .  D    O     E .  D    O    E  . 
Toyota  Century, Crown, Carina  50    674  50    946  26,026  50  1,091  31,304 
Toyopet  Mark II, Corona, Corsa  52    794  52  1,015  30,879  52    960  25,579 
Corolla  Celica, Camry, Corolla, Tercel 82  1,098  77  1,265  31,787  75  1,335  33,366 
Auto   Chaser, Sprinter, Starlet  69    779  66    925  20,251  66    972  20,535 
Vista  Cressida, Camry, Tercel  66    237  66    604  10,525  66    653  11,180 
 
     Note:  D = Dealerships; O = Outlets; E = Employees 
 
 
B.  Change in Numbers of Dealerships Over Time: 
 
 1950  1952  1954  1956  1958  1960  1962  1964  1966  1968  1970  1972  1974  1976  1978  1980 
Toyota  47 47 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 50 50 50 50 
Toyopet      1  40 51 51 51 53 53 52 52 51 51 51 51 52 
Diesel           9   9   9   9  11  11   4   3   2   2   2   1 
Corolla              56 65 86 80 84 82 83 82 82 81 
Auto           45  62  66  67  67  67  69 
Vista                 66 
 





     Sources: Nomura sogo kenkyu jo & Booz Allen & Hamilton, MOSS jidosha chosa saishu 
hokoku sho [Final Report for the MOSS Motor Vehicle Study] IV-10 (unpublished 
manuscript, 1994); Toyota jidosha hanbai, ed., Sekai e no ayumi [Steps Toward the 
World] 40 (Nagoya:  Toyota jidosha hanbai, 1980); Nikkan jidosha shimbun sha & Nihon 
jidosha kaigi sho, eds., Jidosha nenkan [Automotive Yearbook] 486 (Tokyo:  Nikkan 
jidosha shimbun sha, 1999). 
  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
  Bundled Services.  (i) Maintenance. -- By tradition, Japanese dealers are said 
to bundle a larger package of services with the cars they sell than American dealers do.  
In the U.S., a consumer faces almost completely different sales and repair staff.  He 
buys the car from the former, and takes it for maintenance and repairs to the latter.  In 
Japan, by contrast, the salesman was traditionally said to intermediate all subsequent 
services.   
For example, when a customer finds that his car needs scheduled maintenance, 
unanticipated repairs, or mandatory inspections, traditionally he approached the man 
who made the initial sale.  That salesman then arranged the necessary work.  When 
the consumer bought a new car, the same salesman arranged the trade-in.  Even 
contractual structure was said to reflect this practice:  U.S. dealers rewarded sales, but 
Japanese dealers paid their salesmen by rank and experience (Shimokawa, 1997: 224). 
 
  (ii) Some doubts. -- And yet, this contrast raises an obvious question:  why 
would these differences in service quality exist?  Observers typically posit radical 
differences in consumer characteristics:  Americans are more likely to see cars as 
everyday tools (and therefore prefer a lower price even if with less service), where 
Japanese more often see them as status-marking luxury goods (and therefore value the 
pandering at the shop); Americans know more about cars (and thus need less 
intermediation), where Japanese know less (and thus want more help at the shop); and 
so forth.   
Still, to the extent that consumers in the U.S. and Japan differ along these 
dimensions, they differ at the mean.  In both countries they exhibit large variations.   
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Many Americans see cars as status-marking toys (why else buy an SUV from 
Mercedes Benz?), and many could never find a spark plug (or would look for one in a 
diesel).  Some would not even know how to open the hood.  Many Japanese 
(particularly outside Tokyo) use their cars for daily commutes.  Many (particularly 
young males) could and do perform routine maintenance on their own.   
 Given  this  intra-national variation in consumers, basic logic suggests that we 
should see substantial intra-national variation in dealership practices.  In both 
countries, we would expect some dealers to price low and service cursorily, while 
others price higher and bundle better service.  Consumer differences may lead to 
differences in the relative prevalence of the different dealership types, but they should 
not lead to corner solutions.   
 
  (iii) Service variation across brands. -- Stereotypes notwithstanding, this 
intra-national variation in service quality is exactly what one sees.  As a rough proxy 
for service quality, consider the number of customers a dealership employee must 
service.  The proxy is obviously imperfect, but the higher the number of cars sold per 
employee, the less time each employee will have to care for a customer.
11  As Table 
1.4A shows, the vehicle-sales/employee figure varies widely across manufacturers -- 
from 11-13 at Nissan and Toyota, to 25-50 at Subaru, Daihatsu, and Suzuki.   
Crucially, the variation in service quality correlates with the quality of the cars 
sold.  In general, one would expect the demand for high-quality service to correlate 
with the demand for high-quality automobiles.  Although each manufacturer sells a 
variety of models, one basic index of average quality is the fraction of cars at the 
cheapest end of the spectrum -- the “light” cars.  Toyota and Nissan sell no such cars, 
while Daihatsu and Suzuki sell almost nothing else.   
  Table 1.4B gives the correlation between the fraction of its production a 
manufacturer devotes to light cars (Light/Total) and the number of cars sold per 
dealership employee (Vehicles/Employee).  At .89, the correlation is extremely high:  
the more a company specializes in the very cheapest cars, the fewer employees it uses 
to service its customers.   
Table 1.4C reiterates the point.  The table divides dealers according to the 
principal cars they sell, by four descending price categories -- large cars, mid-sized & 
compact cars, “mass market” cars, and light cars.  In 1998, profits/sales did not 
monotonically vary either by price or by sales/employee.  Both the number of cars 
sold per employee and employee wage, however, did vary by automobile quality:  as 
car quality dropped, the number of cars sold per employee increased, while employee 
wage fell.  As we move from the better to the cheaper models, in other words, 
customers find fewer people to help them, and the people they encounter are less able.  
 
  (iv) Intra-brand service variation. -- The same correlation between product 
and service quality appears within firms.  Contrast the high-end “Toyota” dealerships 
with the middle-market “Corolla” dealerships (see Table 1.2.A.).  “Toyota” dealers 
use an average 29 employees per outlet, while “Corolla” dealerships use 25 per outlet.  
Although we do not have exact sales per dealership line, we use sales of the various 
models to estimate dealer sales.  
The resulting back-of-the-envelope calculations again suggest that service 
quality correlates with product quality.  On average, the premium “Toyota”-line 
                     
11 Of the 177 employees at the mean Japanese dealership in 1998, 65 were in sales, 55 in repair, 
and 57 in other positions.  Nikkan (1999: 533).  
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employees sell 7.3 cars annually.  By contrast, the mass-market “Corolla” staff sell an 
average 11.2 cars annually.
12   The implication is the same:  the dealers who sell 
premium cars bundle them with high-quality service; the dealers who sell cheaper cars 
bundle them with lower-quality service.   
 
                     
12 Calculated by excluding sales of models sold by other dealership lines.  If one includes such 
cars, the figure is 12.2 per employee. for the “Toyota” dealers, and 14.3 for the “Corolla” dealers.  
Watanabe (1999,  123); Toyota (2000).  
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Table 1.4:  Service and Automobile Quality 
 
A.  Sales, Employees, Outlets: 
 Total    Light   Vehic  . Vehic. 
 Sales  Total  Employee  Outlet 
Toyota 1664483  0  13.6  332.2 
Nissan   773651  0  11.4  254.6 
Honda   705902  .41  21.2  306.2 
Suzuki   619213  .94  49.6  958.5 
Mitsubishi   585707  .47  14.7  748.0 
Daihatsu   522524  .98  35.7 754.0 
Mazda   315260  .15  15.1  171.2 
Subaru   302064  .59  24.6  546.2 
 
B.  Correlation Coefficients: 
   Total    Light  Vehic  . Vehic. 
   Sales  Total  Employee  Outlet 
Total Sales   1.000 
Light/Total   -.469  1.000 
Vehic/Emp    -.274    .888  1.000 
Vehic/Otlt     -.212   .861   .784  1.000 
 
D.  Sales per Employee by Size of Primary Vehicles Sold 
in 
    Store, 1998: 
    Mid-size &  Mass 
 Large  Compact  Market  Light 
Vehic sales/Employee   
   (monthly units)    0.6    1.5    1.6    2.8 
Wage/Employee 
   (monthly, x1000 yen)    376    362    335    333 
Profits/Sales  13.1% 15.4% 16.2%  14.5% 
Sales/Employee 
   (monthly, x1000 yen)  5,133  4.292  3,518  4,267 
 
     Notes:  By Japanese regulation, a light car has 660 cc-or-
less displacement, and meets assorted size requirements.  By 
custom, a mass-market car is a low-end compact with about a 
1,000-1,500 cc engine and a price of 700,000-2,000,000 yen -- the 
Toyota Corolla and Nissan Sunny are typical examples.  See Kosei 
(1992: 143). 
 
     Sources:  Nikkan jidosha shimbun sha & Nihon jidosha 
kaigi sho, eds., Jidosha nenkan [Automotive Yearbook] 486, 
530-31 (Tokyo:  Nikkan jidosha shimbun sha, 1999); Toyota 
jidosha, Toyota no gaikyo, 2000 [An Outline of Toyota, 
2000] 69 (Tokyo:  Toyota jidosha, 2000).  
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(v) Service variation across countries. -- Return, then to the central cross-
cultural stereotype:  Japanese dealers offer higher quality service than U.S. dealers.  Is 
this true?  Intra-national variation aside, is average service quality higher in Japan 
than in the U.S.?  Consider again the number of cars sold per employee.  In Japan, in 
1998 the 355,000 employees of franchised dealers sold 5.9 million vehicles -- 16.57 
vehicles per employee.  In the U.S., in 1998 the 1,081,000 employees of franchised 
dealers sold 15,971,000 total vehicles -- 14.77 vehicles per employee.
13   
If anything, the basic figures suggest Japanese dealers provide lower quality 
service than U.S. dealers.  We will not push the argument that far.  We recognize that 
cars/employee figures only imperfectly proxy for service, and (for reasons discussed 
below) U.S. consumers may need more repairs per car than Japanese consumers.   
Nonetheless, the fact remains that a customer at a Japanese dealer will find fewer 
people to help him than a customer at a U.S. dealer.   
Dealership revenues add a curious twist to this discussion:  Japanese dealers 
rely more on new car sales, while U.S. dealers rely more on parts and service.   
According to Table 1.5 (the revenues and mean value-added at Japanese and U.S. 
dealers), Japanese dealers generate a higher portion of their total dealership value-
added through new car sales (44.4 percent) relative to later service (46.0 percent), 
than U.S. dealers do (30.2 percent through new cars; 39.5 percent through parts and 
service).  Analogously, dealership value-added is a higher fraction of new car 
revenues in Japan than in the U.S. (9.6 percent compared to 6.4 percent); it is a lower 
fraction of parts and service in Japan than in the U.S. (35.4 percent compared to 44.5 
percent).  
One could posit several alternative (or overlapping) explanations for this.   
Without purporting to test them against each other, we outline them here.  First, 
perhaps Japanese dealers simply provide less service.  After all, as discussed above 
they do have fewer employees per car sold.   
Second, perhaps U.S. dealers provide more parts and service because U.S. 
consumers drive older cars.  After all, North American drivers do own 14.3 times as 
many cars as they buy each year, while Japanese drivers own only 10.4 times as many 
(Watanabe, 1999: 4-7).  Because of the draconian inspection requirements, Japanese 
drivers take cars off the road earlier than Americans do, and -- rumor has it -- ship 
them to Vladivostok.   
Last, perhaps Japanese dealers bundle more “after-care” service with the initial 
purchase.  Perhaps both dealers provide comparable service in other words, but in 
Japan the dealer charges for the later service at the time of the new car purchase.  In 
the U.S. he charges for the car and service separately. 
                     
13 Japanese dealers sold 4.1 million passenger cars -- or 11.54 passenger cars per employee.  U.S. 
dealers sold 8.1 million passenger cars -- or 7.53 passenger cars per employee.  Watanabe (1999: 222) 
(car sales); Nikkan (1999: 486) (Japanese employees); NADA (2000) (U.S. employees).  For reasons of 
data availability at the time of writing, we were forced to couple 1999 dealership data and 1998 sales 
data for the U.S..  
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A.  U.S. Dealership, 1999 (x $1000): 
 
     A.    B. 
    Gross Dealer   B/Total 
  Revenue Val.Add B/A  (%) Val.Add  (%) 
 
New Car  16,371  1,041   6.4   30.2 
Used Car   7,899  1,048  13.3   30.4 
Parts & Service   3,061  1,362  44.5   39.5     . 
 
Total 27,331  3,452  12.6  100.0 
 
 
B.  Japanese Dealership, 1997 (x 1,000,000 yen): 
 
     A.    B. 
    Gross Dealer   B/Total 
  Revenue Val.Add B/A  (%) Val.Add  (%) 
 
New Car  5,381.5    516.6   9.6   44.4 
Used Car    930.8    110.8  11.9    9.5 
Parts & Service  1,509.6    535.1  35.4   46.0     . 
 




  Notes:  Sums do not total because of rounding. 
  
  Sources:  Reconstructed from data given in NADA 
(National Automobile Dealers Association), NADA Data, 
2000 (www.nada.org, 2000); Nikkan jidosha shimbun sha & 
Nihon jidosha kaigi sho, eds., Jidosha nenkan [Automotive 
Yearbook] 530-31 (Tokyo:  Nikkan jidosha shimbun sha, 
1999).  
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  Exclusive Arrangements.  Japanese manufacturers generally appoint their 
dealers principal agents for given models within a given geographical area.   
Traditionally, they assigned a dealer the entire prefecture.  More recently, they divide 
the larger metropolitan areas, but they still assign the smaller prefectures to a single 
dealer. Generally, these contracts require the dealer to focus his sales efforts within 
the area, but do not prohibit him from selling outside it (Nomura & Booz, 1994: II 19-
21). 
Japanese manufacturers do not prohibit their dealers from selling the cars of 
competing manufacturers.  Before 1980 they generally did.  In two steps dating from 
about 1980 and 1990, however, the Fair Trade Commission took an increasingly 
adamant position against the contracts.  By most accounts, manufacturers have since 
abandoned the arrangements.
14 
According to an early 1990s survey, 18 percent of all Japanese authorized 
domestic car dealers handled the cars of multiple manufacturers, while 22 percent of 
U.S. dealers did.  In fact, however, most of the 22 percent U.S. dealers had negotiated 
multiple franchises, while only 4-5 percent of Japanese dealers had done so.  The rest 
apparently handled the other cars through their principal domestic franchise 
agreement.  Through 1991, for example, VW sold through Nissan; in 1992, it moved 
to Toyota.  Honda sold Jeeps, Mazda sold Fords and Citroens, Suzuki sold GM and 
Pugeots, and Subaru sold Volvos (Nomura & Booz, 1994: III 14-19). 
 
  Relational Term.  By common consensus, Japanese dealers seem to maintain 
longer-term ties with their manufacturers than do U.S. dealers.
15  They maintain more 
direct financial ties as well.  As of 1991 Japanese manufacturers held equity stakes in 
one-third of their dealers (foreign manufacturers had equity stakes in only 5 percent of 
their dealers).  In addition, they had loaned funds long-term to 40 percent.  Of the 
dealerships in which the manufacturer had an equity stake, 25 percent were wholly 
owned subsidiaries; 58 percent were dealers where the manufacturer held a less-than 5 
percent stake (Nomura & Booz, 1994: II 5-8).   
Unfortunately, the question of relational length is a red herring.  Recall that a 
Japanese dealer is often the exclusive distributor (functionally exclusive, not legally 
exclusive) for several of a manufacturer’s models for an entire prefecture.  Given that 
status, the manufacturer simply cannot let the dealer fail.  Toyota cannot afford to lose 
the only firm that distributes six of its models to an entire prefecture, and neither can 
Nissan, Mazda, or anyone else.  Indeed, when they invest in their dealers they do so 
exactly by that logic -- for they are most likely to invest in the least profitable 
distributors (Nomura & Booz, 1994: II 7).  Japanese dealers may have dealt with a 
given manufacturer longer than U.S. dealers have, in short, but they have also been in 
business much longer.  They have been in business longer because Japanese 
manufacturers cannot afford to let them fail. 
Rather than compare U.S. dealers to Japanese dealers, compare U.S. dealers to 
Japanese outlets, and consider the impact of demographic change.  In any society, 
                     
14 Nomura & Booz (1994: II 16-17, 27-28).  They now appear to be most common among import 
dealers. 
15 This is not related to formal contractual length.  According to one survey, a majority of dealers 
work under a franchise contract with no stated term, but 30 percent work under a 3-year term.   
Generally, the contracts allow the manufacturer to terminate the contract only for cause (failure to pay 
moneys due, other breach of contract, and so forth) (Nomura & Booz, 1994: II 24-25).  
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people and firms move.  As they do, cities change.  The government builds new 
highways, runs new train lines, changes zoning rules.  Rural areas become suburban, 
residential areas turn into office parks.  Some roads lose traffic, others gain.   
Necessarily, these demographic changes alter the optimal location of new car 
showrooms.  New showrooms open, while others will close.  If (as in the U.S.) each 
showroom is a separate dealer, these changes will yield a data base in which the 
average length of the dealer-manufacturer relationship is relatively short.  If (as in 
Japan) each showroom is just another outlet for the prefectural dealer (whom the 
manufacturer cannot afford to let fail), the vicissitudes of demographic shifts will not 
affect the observed duration of the dealer-manufacturer relationship.  
In Table 1.6, we give the total number of outlets for each dealer.  Take Toyota 
-- perhaps the most consistent performer in the industry.  Over the past 15 years, 
Toyota has gained at least 2,190 new outlets, or nearly half its current total.
16  Subaru 
has added at least 133 (24 percent of the current total), and Suzuki has added 954 (69 
percent of the current).  Even more astonishing are Honda and Mazda.  During the 
same fifteen years, Honda has added at least 2,479 outlets (more than the current 
total), and closed 411 (15 percent of the peak total).
17  Similarly, Mazda has added at 
least 1,572 outlets (85 percent of current), and closed 1040 (36 percent of the peak). 
Because Table 1.6 gives only the net annual change per producer it 
undercounts the true number of new and closed outlets.  To illustrate turnover at a 
more local level, Table 6 gives the number of greater-Tokyo area outlets for several 
dealer lines for 1979, 1989, and 1999.  The “Toyota,” “Nissan,” and “Mazda” lines 
are the premium dealer lines for these manufacturers.  The “Corolla” and “Sunny” 
dealer lines are the low-end lines for Toyota and Nissan.  Obviously, the table misses 
any netting effect from outlets added and lost during the intervening years. 
Nonetheless, the table again illustrates the impact of demographic change.   
From 1979 to 1999, Toyota added at least 309 Tokyo-area outlets in these two lines 
(49 percent of the current total); Nissan added 229 (48 percent of the current total); 
and Mazda added 42 (48 percent of the current total).  Since 1970, Toyota has added 
at least 417 outlets (67 percent of the current total), while Nissan has added 330 (70 
percent of the current).  About half of the Tokyo-area outlets, apparently, have 
appeared since 1970; over two-thirds have appeared since 1970.  
                     
16 Calculated from Table 1.6A as (4966 - 3699) + (5011 - 4088). 
17 (2652 - 2241) / 2652.  
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Table 1.6: U.S. Dealers and Japanese Outlets 
  
    U.S.  Japan. 
 Dealers  Outlets  Toyota Nissan Mitsub.  Mazda Honda Isuzu  Subaru  Suzuki 
 
1985 24725  11048  3699 2988 1358  1310   237 608  421    427 
 
1990 24825    N.A.  4529 2977 1289  N.A.   814 571  491  N.A. 
1991 24,200  16332  4755 3066 1291  2718 2652 561  501    788 
1992 23,500  16538  4755 3176 1319  2762 2652 563  502    809 
1993 22,950  16942  4901 3176 1344  2882 2371 565  536  1167 
1994 22,850  16355  4936 3099 1374  2412 2246 540  537  1211 
 
1995 22,800  16374  4966 3090 1386  2412 2241 519  536  1224 
1996 22,750  15569  4088 3071 1430  2412 2295 501  539  1233 
1997 22,700  16170  4977 3048 1430  2106 2295 503  541  1270 
1998 22,600  16201  4989 3043 1473  2009 2299 498  551  1339 
1999 22,400  16088  5011 3039 1477  1842 2305 480  553  1381 
 
 
     Sources: NADA (National Automobile Dealers Association), NADA Data, 2000 
(www.nada.org, 2000); Nikkan jidosha shimbun sha & Nihon jidosha kaigi sho, eds., 
Jidosha nenkan [Automotive Yearbook] (Tokyo:  Nikkan jidosha shimbun sha, various 
years). 
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Table 1.7:  Greater Tokyo Area Dealerships --  
Outlets for Selected Lines, 1979-99 
 
 
          Toyota               Nissan                Mazda  
 
             1979  89  99               1979  89  99               1979  89  99 
“Toyota” dealer line    “Nissan” dealer line    “Mazda” dealer line 
Tokyo  T  27 40 41  Tokyo  N  23 53 52  Tokyo  M  10 14   7 
Ibaragi T  16  27  37  Shin-Tokyo N  22   0   0  Ibaragi M   2   1   0 
Tochigi T  12  15  20  Ibaragi N  11  19  26  Mito M   7   8  11 
Gunma  T  17 20 20  Tochigi  N  10 14 17  Tochigi  M    7 10 10 
Saitama T  17  27  38  Gunma N  17  18  21  M Auto Gunma   0  10  11 
Chiba  T  19 27 41  Saitama  N  16 18 37  Saitama  M  18 22 24 
Kanagawa  T  27 39 57  Chiba  N  19 23 30  Chiba  M  16 21 19 
        Kanagawa  N  25 37 46  Kanagawa  M  16 25   6 
        N Torakku Kan.  7   0   0 
 
“Corolla” dealer line    “Sunny” dealer line 
Tokyo  C  21 64 66  S  Tokyo  27 35 57 
Shin-Tokyo C  15   0   0  S Shin-Tokyo  10  17   0 
Nishi-Tokyo C  14  23  26  S Keio   3   0   0 
C Adachi   4   5   4  S Ibaragi  9  13  22 
C Sugamo   3   3   0  S Mito   7   7   0 
C Takashimaya   3   0   0  S Tochigi  10  12  15 
C Musashino   3   0   0  S S Gunma  14  19  17 
Tokyo T Diesel  5   0   0  S Saitama-kita 10   8   9 
C Ibaragi  11  16  13  S Saitama-min   9  21  29 
C Hitachi   9  12  16  S Chiba  14  16  19 
C Tochigi  14   7  18  S Chiba-kita   7   9  13 
C  Gunma  10 13 16  S  Kanagawa  17 26 34 
C  Takasaki  10 10 12  S  Shonan  19 26 30 
C  Saitama  18 31 36 
C  Shin-Saitama  15 25 32 
C  Chiba  17 27 53 
C  Keiyo  11 16   0 
C  Kanagawa  36 53 61 
C  Yokohama  18 18 18 
 
 
     Source: Nikkan jidosha shimbun sha & Nihon jidosha kaigi sho, eds., Jidosha 
nenkan [Automotive Yearbook] (Tokyo:  Nikkan jidosha shimbun sha, various years).  
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4.6  Exclusion and Efficiency 
  If any aspects of these distribution patterns exclude, we do not see how.  This 
is not an industry that has kept out new entrants.  During the early years, Toyota and 
Nissan did dominate the market.  Yet Subaru, Mazda, and Mitsubishi entered it 
successfully by exploiting the niche for very small cars.  Honda and Suzuki entered it 
by using their background in motorcycles.  Mercedes Benz and BMW entered it by 
using their international reputations for quality. 
  The distributional requirements in the industry do not demand of the foreign 
firms tasks they cannot do.  Should the foreign firms choose to organize large-scale 
Toyota-style distribution networks, we know of nothing that would prevent them.   
Importantly, the Honda example illustrates the way that they need not do so.  Firms 
can survive and thrive with U.S.-style one-distributor-one-outlet networks as well.   
  If consumers want high-quality service, we know of nothing that would 
prevent foreign firms from providing it.  If they want door-to-door salesmen, we know 
of nothing that would prevent foreign firms from hiring them.  Importantly again, 
however, the data do not show that Japanese consumers do want unusually high levels 
of service, and Japanese consumers increasingly buy cars off the showroom floors. 
  Neither do we see how any of these practices could be inefficient.  As foreign 
firms have discovered to their chagrin, this is a ruthlessly competitive industry.   
Regulatory strictures do not mandate the distributional patterns in place.  Neither do 
network- and coordination-problems prevent firms from adopting distributional 
improvements.  The arrangements in place might superficially differ from those in the 
U.S.  By all appearances, though, they accomplish much the same results. 
 
5.  UNRAVELING DISTRIBUTION 
  More than a decade has passed since SII and the store wars -- a decade to 
move beyond negotiation strategy, a decade to unravel distributional practices.  For 
several reasons, it has not been easy.  Economic theory provides less help than one 
might want.  For lack of a well-developed theory of distribution, Peter Drucker once 
called the sector the “Economy’s Dark Continent.”  That is too strong, perhaps, but 
the contrast with production is nonetheless stark.  For the production sector, analysts 
will find in the economic corpus a well-honed, heavily tested apparatus.  About 
distribution, they will find considerably less.  
  Not only is the theory relatively undeveloped, the phenomena are diverse.   
Kao sells detergents through exclusive distributors, while Lion sells on the general 
wholesale market.  Pola sells cosmetics door to door, while Shiseido sells through 
exclusive distributors to retail chains.  Toyota sells to large multi-outlet distributors, 
while Honda began with a one-outlet-per-dealer strategy.  In production, the diversity 
is less severe.  There, each firm in an industry faces more nearly similar, 
technologically constrained choices.  As a result, firms generally choose similar 
production strategies.  Where they do not, observers can usually gauge their relative 
efficiency.   
Reflecting the diversity in distribution across industries, the authors to this 
book understandably advance diverse hypotheses.  In general, however, through their 
(and our) work, they (and we) stress one of more of the following common themes:  
that one cannot understand distribution apart from the characteristics of the product 
distributed -- both the demand patterns and manufacturing technology involved; that 
even given those product characteristics, considerable room for diversity in 
distribution remains; and that distribution practices in Japan are closer to those in 
other advanced economies than observers have usually noticed.  We think the studies  
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clarify the empirics in Japan.  We hope they contribute to understanding distribution 
more generally.  
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